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AFRICA: DEMOCRATIZATION,
CULTURAL PLURALISM, AND THE
CHALLENGE OF POLITICAL ORDER
Crawford Young
I. Competing Images of AfricaAt the turn of the millennium, contradictory images of Africa jostle
for our attention. One portrait, painted in glowing colors during the
epochal (but swiftly forgotten) tour of Africa by President William
Clinton in March 1998, sketches an Africa of resurrection and renova-
tion, propelled by liberating currents of democratization, and embod-
ied by a new generation of leaders unencumbered by dogmas and
practices of a failed past.1 A “third wave” of democratization, identi-
fied by Samuel Huntington,2 washed across Africa in what once
seemed an unstoppable tide, initially triggered by a wave of urban
rioting in Algiers in October 1988, and the startling seizure of effective
power by a “sovereign national conference” in Benin at the beginning
of 1990. At the end of the decade, although the momentum of democ-
ratization had long ebbed, new avatars appeared in the form of crucial
and seemingly successful elections in Nigeria and South Africa.
A second, less happy image emerged in 1993 and 1994 in Burundi
and Rwanda, where democratic transitions decanted into veritable eth-
nic holocausts, taking the lives of well over a million people.3 In the
wake of these interactive disasters, many hundreds of thousands were
displaced, most into neighboring countries. The eddies of violent eth-
nic conflict continue to swirl, spilling into neighboring states, and con-
stituting an endemic source of disorder in the African Great Lakes
region. In this picture, the demons of ethnic and religious difference
haunt Africa, lurking in the background as an omnipresent menace to
fragile political institutions.
3
A third image took form almost simultaneously with the first sweep
of democratization. In 1991, at two ends of the continent, state institu-
tions simply dissolved. The fate of Somalia and Liberia opened to view
an entirely novel and unanticipated outcome: state collapse.4 Other
cases were to follow, most notably Sierra Leone. This representation of
an Africa spiraling downward into a maelstrom of uncontrollable dis-
order achieved popular currency through the widely-read Robert
Kaplan article on “the coming anarchy.”5 Worse, the torments of Sierra
Leone and Liberia were a mere preview of what lay in store for a wider
universe; “West Africa is becoming the symbol of worldwide demo-
graphic, environmental, and societal stress, in which criminal anarchy
emerges as the real ‘strategic’ threat,”6 wrote Kaplan. The excessively
lurid colors of the Kaplan portrait repelled many readers.7 But during
the course of the 1990s, two significant multi-country zones of
intractable, interpenetrated civil strife emerged, one stretching from
Liberia to Mauritania, and the other from the Horn of Africa in a
southwestward arc to Angola and the two Congos. In more than a
dozen of Africa’s 53 states, governments failed to pass the Weberian
test of stateness: an effective monopoly of the means of coercion within
their territorial domain.
Thus, issues of democracy, cultural pluralism, and political order
are central to Africa at the dawn of the 21st century. Few voices clamor
for a return to the patrimonial autocracies that served as the dominant
form of polity during most of the postindependence period. Indeed,
the sheer magnitude of the contemporary challenge to statecraft is a
legacy of the manifold flaws of this form of rule. In spite of its disap-
pointments and imperfections, the struggle for adapted and natural-
ized democratic institutions will continue. Effective accommodation of
cultural diversity remains central to the processes and practices of a
liberalized political order. The potential for escalated ethnic or reli-
gious conflict is present in many countries, but is not ineluctable. The
revelation in this decade of the debilitated institutional capacities of a
number of states, and the high costs of endemic disorder, make “bring-
ing the state back in”8 indispensable. Though Somalis have exhibited
remarkable resourcefulness in operating a stateless socioeconomic
order for nearly a decade, the outer limits of such survival strategies
are unmistakable.9 The benefits promised for a democratized political
order — a more responsive, accountable, transparent, and moralized
polity—presume the vehicle of a functioning state. Thus, the quest for
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the efficacious state joins democratization and the accommodation of
diversity on the agenda.10
In this essay, I explore these three themes in African politics, and
their interaction. A backward glance at the evolution of this trio will
provide an initial framework. Our main task is to elucidate the dynam-
ics of democratization, cultural pluralism, and civil order in the final
decade of our century.
II. The First Political Moment: Terminal Colonial Politics
Four political moments may be delineated in the postwar trajectory of
African politics. In the first period, extending from 1945 till the sym-
bolic high water mark of African independence in 1960, the core issue
was the organization of a political transition, whose terms and timing
were contested by the withdrawing colonial power and emergent
African nationalism. In a second stage, extending from political inde-
pendence until approximately 1980, a dominant mode of rule
emerged, retrospectively characterized as patrimonial autocracy. A
third political moment appeared about 1980, when a generalized sense
of state crisis took form and deepened during the decade. The present
phase, in the 1990s, opened with democratization as leitmotif, but soon
found the hopes ignited by political opening clouded by the specters of
escalated cultural pluralism, and state weakness or even collapse. A
summary examination of the first three moments will provide the con-
text for a more extended analysis of the fourth.
Two crucial changes redefined the nature of the African colonial
state in the terminal imperial era. Firstly, Britain and France, the key
colonial powers in Africa, had both made wartime commitments, in
part to ensure the fidelity of the African subject to imperial defense, to
create for the first time some scope for their participation in state man-
agement. On the eve of World War II, Malcolm MacDonald had
pledged the “ultimate establishment of the great commonwealth of
free peoples and nations,” though adding that “generations, perhaps
centuries,” might pass before the goal was accomplished.11 The French,
at the 1944 Brazzaville conference on postwar African policy,
promised “an ever greater part in the life and in the democratic institu-
tions of the French community,” while ruling out self-government.12
Belgium was ultimately dragged along into the wake of these commit-
ments, which led ineluctably to the creation of representative institu-
tions with African participation. These, in turn, required loosening the
Crawford Young
5
comprehensive restrictions on African political action. At a pace far
more rapid than foreseen or intended, political space opened for politi-
cal parties and other instrumentalities of a nascent civil society. The
value of democracy made its first appearance on the African colonial
scene.
The second major transformation, little noted at the time, was an
extraordinary expansion in the scope of state action. This emanated
partly from a defensive reaction to the crisis of legitimation brought
about by the hostile scrutiny of colonial welfare by a newly critical
international community, and by the steadily expanding clamor of
African subjects and their political spokespeople for the basic infra-
structure for a better life: schools, clinics, safe water, local roads. But
equally important was the dramatic increase in the resources available
to the terminal colonial state. In the years between the eve of World
War II and independence, state revenue in Ghana and Nigeria
expanded tenfold, while in the Belgian Congo it multiplied by thirty.13
To this revenue bonanza was added, for the first time in the colonial
era, significant infusions of metropolitan public capital by way of vari-
ous colonial development funds. These developments paradoxically
created a rapid expansion of the European-staffed superstructure of
the state, a phenomenon labeled a “second colonial occupation” by
Hargreaves, who noted that this produced “a large-scale infusion of
technical experts, whose activities . . . increased the ‘intensity’ of colo-
nial government.”14
We may detect in these twin processes the opening of a dialectic
between democracy and stateness which continues until today. The
very essence of the colonial state was its alien and authoritarian nature:
a superstructure of European hegemony superimposed by force on
diverse African societies, which were constituted as mere subjects of
imperial occupation. Although a tiny handful of Africans or Afro-
Caribbeans worked their way some distance up the colonial hierar-
chies, the command posts in the central and territorial administration
remained almost entirely in European control till the very end.
Although the Belgian Congo was perhaps an extreme example, with
only three Africans out of 4,632 bureaucrats in the top three ranks of
the civil service in 1960,15 similar patterns existed until the eve of inde-
pendence even in Senegal, Ghana, and Nigeria, where the pool of qual-
ified Africans was substantial. Alien control remained even more
marked in the security forces; nowhere were armies under African
command at the moment of independence (save in the few cases where
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decolonization occurred through armed struggle), and often remained
under European command for some time after power transfer (1961 in
Ghana, 1965 in Nigeria). Even in Nigeria, where Africanization of the
officer corps began in 1953, at independence there were only 61 Niger-
ian officers, few of field grade.16 The alterity of the colonial state was
profound and comprehensive—politically, culturally, racially.
The inner core of democratization was, in contrast, African, even
though for variable periods immigrant races often clamored for a dis-
proportionate role (for instance, “racial partnership” in its various
guises in British-ruled eastern and central African territories and the
dual college electorate arrangements in French-ruled Africa until
1956). The growing voice of African nationalism at once combated and
contested the political authority of the terminal colonial state, yet
viewed favorably rapid state expansion, a process which indeed
became naturalized in the expectations of the elite as a normal condi-
tion. Even though the harshness and brutality associated with earlier
phases of colonial rule rapidly softened in the postwar years, there
were ample vexations from which to weave a narrative of protest. As
distinctly political representative institutions gained scope and author-
ity, African nationalism found through democratization a vehicle for
challenging the prevarication and dilatory maneuvers of colonial
authorities seeking to prolong their final tutelage. The state was thus
an adversary of democratic forces, yet at the same time a prize to be
won. Discourses of revolutionary transformation notwithstanding, the
actual agenda of African nationalists was above all occupation of the
institutional infrastructure of the colonial state. The aphorism attrib-
uted to Ghanaian independence leader Kwame Nkrumah, “Seek ye
first the political kingdom, and all else shall follow,” was the well-
articulated major premise in the conquest of sovereignty.
In the 1950s, as democratization brought frequent competition, the
issue of cultural pluralism came to the fore. The multi-ethnic nature of
African societies was, of course, familiar to all, and indeed had long
served among the justifications for alien rule. In addition, regional
administration had generally been erected upon a primordial “tribal”
template, which in turn had a powerful impact upon the social con-
struction of African identities.17 Tribalism was frequently perceived as
an essentially rural phenomenon, with the newly urbanized African
detribalized. This reading confused the larger matrix of local struc-
tures of rural community with the issue of ethnic identity; urban
migration involved at least partial exit from the former, and often
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redefinition of the latter, around larger identity constructs. The urban
environment was also the locus for new forms of ethnic organization,
in the shape of welfare or burial societies and social groupings. What
was unclear, however, was the dynamic that would ensue from the
encounter of cultural pluralism with the democratic process, initially
confined to electoral contest for seats in representative bodies.
Once anticolonial struggle began in earnest, it was soon territorial-
ized; an earlier pan-African discourse remained a dream for some, but
effective combat could only occur at the territorial level. Nationalism
thus came to embrace the territory as supreme locus of legitimate iden-
tity. Tribalism, invariably the weapon of one’s adversaries, was casti-
gated as subversive to the struggle, and redolent of backwardness. Yet,
for all contenders, the existence of ethnic consciousness constituted a
tempting reservoir of possible vote banks. Once given, ethnic vote
banks were monetized, the logic of competitive difference took hold,
and rival groupings were tempted to align with competing formations.
The withdrawing colonial powers, now preoccupied with honorable
exit and the need for internationally respectable political structures as
legacy, insisted on open competition (though they were not above
covert support to the most moderate groupings, especially in the
French and Belgian cases).
With a few exceptions (Senegal, for example), ethnicity and, in the
cases of Uganda and Sudan, religious sect or denomination, became
central vectors in political competition. The very dramaturgy of
democracy as electoral process tended to illuminate its impact. The
independence elections in particular were highly charged; the stakes—
conquest of state power — were immense, and the unfathomable costs
of exclusion through alignment with a losing party raised the emo-
tional temperature. For the winners, too, the view that cultural plural-
ism was a dangerous adversary was reinforced.
III. The Second Political Moment: the Would-Be Integral State
The achievement of independence redefined the interaction of democ-
racy, cultural pluralism, and the state. In a trend swiftly manifest
throughout the continent, democracy understood as competitive party
politics and cultural pluralism fell into disfavor. The state, on the other
hand, was the supreme agency of fulfillment of the promises of nation-
alism. To achieve its historic mission of bringing rapid development to
Africa, the state required unencumbered power. Open political compe-
Macalester International Vol. 9
8
tition was divisive and hampered the state in marshaling resources
and energies for development. Indeed, such energies were in finite
supply; those diverted into political party competition subtracted
directly from the capacities for development. “At the present stage of
Ghana’s economic development the whole community must act in the
national interest,” wrote Kwame Nkrumah. “In fact, most of our devel-
opment so far has had to be carried out by the Government itself.
There is no other way out. . . . ”18
Such reasoning was entirely consistent with dominant wisdom in
the world at large with respect to overcoming underdevelopment.19
Irrespective of ideological preference, a central state role as theologian,
organizer, manager, and, indeed, proprietor of development was
beyond dispute. The war against poverty, ignorance, and disease
required no less. Responsive to this universally shared vision, African
state builders set to work. Especially during the 1970s, the state
domain experienced vast expansion through a wave of nationalization
measures and the launching of a vast array of state-owned enterprises.
The social service sector, especially education, was rapidly expanded,
with missions elbowed aside by the state as school proprietors. The
numbers of ministries and agencies multiplied. In capitalist Nigeria,
for example, which already had 75 state enterprises in 1960, the num-
ber exploded to 500 by the 1980s; the number of state employees
increased from 70,000 to one million.20 In officially socialist Tanzania,
former economic advisor to the Tanzanian government Reginald
Green noted with satisfaction that by the mid-1970s, 80% of the
medium and large-scale economic activity lay in the public sector, a
figure higher than that for Soviet bloc states at a comparable time after
the imposition of state socialism.21
Nation building went hand in hand with state building. An ambi-
tious project of erasure of cultural pluralism was undertaken. In 1959,
Guinean leader Sekou Toure famously observed that, “In three or four
years, no one will remember the tribal, ethnic or religious rivalries
which, in the recent past, caused so much damage to our country and
its population.”22 Although few would have gone quite so far as Toure,
the belief was widely held that ethnicity and religion could be safely
relegated to the private sphere, and banished from public life. To
achieve this end, political party competition was an unaffordable lux-
ury. The extensive pedagogical resources of the state — the media and
educational system—were deployed to foster the precept of territorial
state as nation-in-becoming. The resiliency of the African state system
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in its hour of weakness bears witness to the indisputable impact of
these didactics.
For political rulers, the vision arose of a veritable “integral state,” a
system of perfected hegemony whereby the state achieves unrestricted
domination over civil society. Thus unfettered, the state is enabled to
pursue its rational design for the future, and amply reward the ruling
group for its services.23 The array of associations that emerged in the
liberalized terminal colonial environment were compelled to reformu-
late themselves as ancillary structures within the ruling party. In turn,
the party became an instrumentality of the will of the ruler. The party
absorbed all individuals and groups, in the process claiming to
embody an organic unified national will, interpreted and applied by
the leader. In the more extreme cases, such as the Congo (Zaire) of
Mobutu Sese Seko in the early 1970s, this extravagantly etatist form of
rule reached surrealistic proportions.24
An effort was made to rationalize single party rule as an organic
form of democracy, in its most jacobin sense. Ritualized forms of imag-
ing popular support—crowds mobilized to applaud the ruler, plebisc-
itary elections, sartorial display of the presidential image — purported
to express a public will. In some cases, competition within the party
was permitted for legislative seats, a practice pioneered by Tanzania.
The most thoughtful claim for the compatibility of single party rule
and democratic practice appeared in the 1965 Tanzania Presidential
Commission on the Establishment of a Democratic One Party State.25
Although the assertion of a democratic ethos was less comprehen-
sively denatured by autocratic practice in Tanzania than in most
instances, the credibility of the claim steadily depreciated.
IV. The Third Political Moment: 
Economic Stagnation and State Crisis
By the end of the 1970s, the perception of a developmental impasse
took root. Not only had the promises of the integral state to bring rapid
and transformative economic expansion failed to materialize, but
symptoms of actual decline appeared. “Afropessimism” percolated
into media treatment of African affairs, echoing views held in official
milieux. A report prepared for the 1979 Organization of African Unity
(OAU) summit in Monrovia came to the dispiriting conclusion that
“Africa . . . is unable to point to any significant growth rate or satisfac-
tory index of general well-being.”26 The 1980s were a decade of conti-
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nental decline. The African external debt, negligible in 1970, ballooned
to over $200 billion by 1990 (and $350 billion today). In most countries,
per capita income dwindled—in a number of cases to levels below that
of 1960. Africa, demonstrated Carl Eicher, was the only major world
region to experience declining per capita food production after 1960.27
The deepening economic crisis was paralleled in the political
sphere. The celebratory tones of the first generation of works examin-
ing African independence faded; in their place emerged, in the 1980s, a
“state crisis” school of analysis. Congolese bishops, in a 1981 pastoral
letter, charged that the state had degenerated into “organized pillage
for the profit of the foreigner and his intermediaries.”28 An influential
study by Naomi Chazan fired an opening salvo in the “state decline”
literature: “The Ghanaian state thus seemed to be on the brink of
becoming less distinctive and relevant. Indeed, some kind of disen-
gagement from the state was taking place . . . an emotional, economic,
social and political detachment from the state element.”29 Jean-François
Bayart added that, “the brutality of the territorial administration, of
the chiefs and of the armed bands which control the countryside con-
stitute . . . reasons for . . . desertion as the sole pertinent response to the
arbitrary action and wasteful consumption of the state . . . [and] . . . con-
tinues to sap civic space, to constrain the process of accumulation of
power and wealth, and to render predation easier than exploitation.”30
The state, in the popular mind, had long ceased to serve as protector
and benefactor. A host of unsavory epithets characterized the state in
popular writing: prebendal state, predatory state, pirate state, vampire
state.
Single party patrimonial autocracy, through the effective monopo-
lization of power by the ruler and his inner clique of henchmen,
appeared to drive cultural pluralism to the margins of political society.
With a few exceptions, the analysis of ethnicity was peripheral to acad-
emic analysis of African politics until the 1980s. Ethnic associations
were widely suppressed, and often ethnic categories disappeared from
censuses. On superficial scrutiny, the observer at the zenith of the inte-
gral state, about 1970, might have concluded that cultural pluralism
had been successfully relegated to the modest private realm, which the
state wished to permit.
But some straws in the wind suggested that, as Vail coyly phrased
the matter, ethnicity “failed to cooperate with its many would-be pall-
bearers.”31 The major civil wars ignited during this period in Nigeria
(1967 – 1970) and southern Sudan (in effect, 1956 – 1972) rested upon
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ethnic forms of consciousness and grievances, although a regional
idiom was employed.32 Another important harbinger was the ethnic
genocidal slaughter in Burundi in l980, when a small Hutu uprising
against the Tutsi-dominated single party military regime was met with
a systemic destruction of Hutu educated classes, and death estimates
ran as high as 200,000.33 An ethnic calculus was discernable in the polit-
ical management by rulers, especially in the command structure of the
security forces. Even as resolutely nation-building a leader as Julius
Nyerere indulged, choosing key military leaders from his Mara
region.34 African rulers responded to the security imperative through
the application of an “ethnic security map” in the structure and control
of their military forces.35 Patrimonial practice honeycombed the politi-
cal realm with clientele networks, within which ethnicity usually sup-
plied the cementing basis of affinity. At the mass level, as
estrangement from the state deepened, ethnic affinity became a sur-
vival resource of first importance. The underground nodes of secure
reciprocities and social solidarity, even if they were denied formal
organization, were critical sites of identity.
The stage was thus set for a comprehensive project of liberalization,
initially confined to the economic sphere but extending, by the end of
the 1980s, to the political realm through an emergent discourse of
democracy. In the pendulum swing between democratization and
stateness discernable in the postwar decades, democracy as prior
virtue regained its ascendancy. As in terminal colonial times, the
nature of the state became stigmatized as the source of societal ills and
discontents. Alien and oppressive in its colonial version, the postcolo-
nial state was over-consuming and under-performing, “kleptocratic”
to its core. The remedy was empowerment of civil society, a term
whose rebirth in the 1980s was in itself emblematic of the new mood.36
In this unfolding dialectic, there were three distinct moments: democ-
racy as avenue of liberation from the alien bureaucratic autocracy of
the colonial state; state as master agency of transformation and nation-
building over the distractions and divisions of democracy; and finally,
democracy as vehicle for remoralizing the political realm and replac-
ing patrimonial autocracy with good governance.
The disrepute of the state in the third political moment reflected
larger discursive trends in the world at large. The rise in the Western
world of what is often termed a neoliberal discourse spilled over into a
particularly harsh external view of the failings of the African state. The
increasingly apparent shortcomings of state socialism and its sundry
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African derivatives of “socialist orientation,” and the fiscal outer limits
confronted by advanced welfare states, opened the door for a tri-
umphant enunciation of the supreme virtues of the liberal market
economy and its political counterpart, the constitutional democratic
state. History deposited upon the world stage a pair of rhetorical
grand masters who translated global trends into discursive talismans,
Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. With the state thus summoned
to dismount from the back of civil society, an array of economic policy
prescriptions congealed into a “Washington consensus” of the interna-
tional financial institutions and the Western policy community. Its
goal was to privatize, deregulate, establish free markets, dismantle
trade controls, and assure free capital movement. Eventually, this pro-
gram extended into the political realm: guarantee individual rights,
assure the rule of law, and enforce accountability and the transparency
of the state through some form of democratization.
The African state first found itself in the cross-hairs of the Washing-
ton consensus in the scorching critique of African economic perfor-
mance in the 1981 World Bank report whose primary author was Elliot
Berg.37 Although African states produced a series of rejoinders, argu-
ing that the essence of the economic crisis lay in a hostile international
environment, their capacity to influence, much less control, a global
discourse was limited by the very vulnerability which they argued.
Through the 1980s, confronted with external debt obligations which
were impossible to meet yet whose fiction of eventual reimbursement
its creditors insisted on maintaining, and government resource short-
falls which made external assistance an absolute necessity, most
African states had little choice but to engage in “structural adjustment”
programs conforming to the requirements of the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (IBRD). In reality, the structural
adjustment prescriptions were rarely applied in their full rigor. States
in their economically enfeebled and politically decayed condition often
lacked the capacity for full application; not infrequently, the social
costs were underestimated and unsustainable. As well, the one
resource remaining in the hands of the African state, deployed with
skill in some instances, was the art of dissimulation in deliberate but
concealed evasion of some of the harsher strictures.38
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V. Democratization as Remedy to State Crisis
Although through the 1980s the remedy for the crisis of the African
state was primarily perceived as economic reform, the limited accom-
plishments of early versions of structural adjustment programs and
the continued shriveling of the legitimacy of the long-incumbent patri-
monial autocrats gradually brought democracy back into the discur-
sive arena. When Richard Sklar used his 1982 African Studies
Association (ASA) presidential address to discuss the theme of democ-
racy in Africa, his message evoked sardonic smiles.39 In 1988, when
Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja devoted an ASA presidential address to a
summons to democratization as the necessary answer to state crisis,
his words closely resonated with events. Simultaneous with his clarion
call was the October 1988 wave of urban riots in Algeria and the shock
wave they produced. The ruling Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) was
a supreme icon of African liberation; its heroic eight year war against a
colonial army of 500,000, and the million casualties endured, paved the
way for negotiated independence of many other African states. The
halo surrounding its version of socialist orientation and its activist
voice in third world anti-imperialist diplomacy yielded a luminous
external image.40 Great was the shock at discovery that urban popular
classes regarded the progressive discourse of the FLN regime as a cyn-
ical camouflage of the political exclusion and economic marginaliza-
tion of the young and the poor, in contrast to the ostentatious affluence
of a venal ruling oligarchy.
Other catalytic events followed in rapid succession, within and out-
side Africa. The surrender of the Afro-Marxist regime of Mathieu
Kerekou at the beginning of 1990 to a hastily constituted “national con-
ference” of the forces vives of Benin ignited a wave of successful
demands for such assemblies in francophone Africa. Abandoned by
the international community and his unpaid bureaucracy, with the
structures of authority shredded, Kerekou had no option but to bow
before the seizure of power by “civil society,” through the declaration
of sovereignty by the national conference, and to accept his own evic-
tion from office by electoral process. The national conference route
brought the ouster of perennial incumbents in Mali, Niger, Congo-
Brazzaville, and Madagascar, as well.
The freeing of Nelson Mandela in South Africa in early 1990, setting
in motion a genuine democratization in South Africa, was yet another
potent trigger. To a lesser extent, the long-awaited liberation of
Macalester International Vol. 9
14
Namibia, sanctioned by an internationally monitored democratic elec-
tion in 1988, contributed to the congealing notion of a democratic tide.
Externally, the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, the 1991 final
collapse of the Soviet Union, and the sudden adoption of nominally
democratic forms throughout the “camp of socialism” demolished
much of what remained in the argument for single party rule, a form of
governance for which the Soviet model supplied elements of theoreti-
cal and practical guidance.
Beyond the role of catalytic agents, regimes now encountered over-
whelming pressures, external and internal, for political opening. By
1990, the United States was overtly pushing for democratization
through a series of outspoken ambassadors (Smith Hempstone in
Kenya, Frances Cook in Cameroon, Melissa Wells in Congo-Kinshasa,
Daniel Simpson in Central African Republic). In the 1990 La Baule
francophone summit conference, French President François Mitterand
briefly joined the summons, suggesting to his African partners that
French aid efforts would become more tepid without political opening.
Even within the World Bank, influential voices argued that political
reform was a necessary companion to economic liberalization; only
through this vehicle could the vague ideal of “governance” be accom-
plished.41
Internally, diverse activists mobilized urban discontents. The pres-
sure of the street, especially in capital cities, increased dramatically; so
also did the risks in confronting mob action with security forces. The
shrinkage of resources had sharply reduced the patrimonial distribu-
tions that previously lubricated political networks and sustained an
array of notables willing and able to induce quietism among their
clientele.
A powerful sense of historical inevitability, external pressures, and
internal dynamics all colluded to bring about a spectacular wave of
democratization. In its apparent spread and scope, the changes were
astounding. Dating the democratic wave from the 1988 Algerian riots,
if one tallies all instances of incumbent succession, including replace-
ment of leaders from within the same party legitimated by electoral
process, one comes to a figure of 25 of the 53 independent African
states. Even if a more rigorous standard of displacement of the ruling
political formation is adopted (and not simply retirement of the incum-
bent ruler), at least a dozen cases of genuine alternation occurred. Neg-
atively put, only Libya has entirely held out against some adaptation
or concession to the external forms of democracy, particularly a seem-
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ingly competitive election. These figures bear witness to the extraordi-
nary sweep of democracy as an official discourse of rule. However, it
must be added that, in a substantial number of cases, democratization
was purely formal, and not accompanied by its genuine practice in the
everyday exercise of rule. In no less than 21 countries, the ruler in
power at the time that the democratic wave began to roll still occupies
the presidential palace.
What, then, may be concluded about a third wave of democracy in
Africa, a decade after its inception?42 By the middle of this decade, a
note of skepticism, if not disillusion, began to set in. Larry Diamond,
whose scholarship and engagement in the democratic process stand
out, asked whether the third wave was over in 1996.43 In an influential
article, Ferhad Zakaria suggested that the third wave was producing
merely “illiberal democracy,” the external shell devoid of the internal
substance.44 The late Nigerian intellectual Claude Ake suggested that
the electoralist form that an important version of democratic transition
took is of a relevance “problematic at best and at worst prone to engen-
der contradictions that tend to derail or trivialize democracy in
Africa.”45 Richard Joseph, an influential scholar-activist in the early
phases of African democratization, concluded by the end of the decade
that much of “really existing democracy” on the continent was merely
“virtual democracy,” marked mainly by its external appearances and
driven by an urgent need of the African state for international “pre-
sentability.”46 A number of African scholars argued that the form of
democracy imposed upon Africa was choiceless, since all regimes were
compelled to march to the drummer of structural adjustment pro-
grams and the Washington consensus.
There is ample justification for this mood of enhanced skepticism.
Wily autocrats learn to manage and manipulate the electoral process:
the Mois, Biyas, and Bongos have many counterparts. Ruling parties
enjoy huge advantages in logistical capacities through their control of
the state apparatus, modalities of transport, and funds, which find
their way to government candidates. Control of television is an impor-
tant weapon, even if some time is made available to the opposition.
Political formations organized to challenge incumbents face acute
resource problems, and are very vulnerable to splintering, often with a
helping hand from the ruler. Thus far, the only clear cases meeting the
Huntingtonian criteria of consolidation — a second electoral alterna-
tion of political formations—are met only in Benin and Madagascar (in
addition to always pluralist Mauritius).
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Still, a return to the authoritarian pretensions of the integral state
era seems improbable. There is no resonating ideology now available
which could legitimate such a return. Nor can a plausible claim be
made, as was once the case in Asia, that authoritarian regimes provide
more competent market economy development until a stage is reached
when per capita income levels make political liberalization more sus-
tainable (Taiwan, South Korea). The catastrophic developmental per-
formance in the long era of integral state dominance shreds any such
proposition. Indeed, the only two African states whose macroeco-
nomic statistics come close to matching Asian norms are Botswana and
Mauritius, the only countries to enjoy democratic rule throughout the
postindependence period. Overall, African economic performance
improved somewhat after the third wave, especially since 1995; in
1997, African regional growth figures actually exceeded those of other
major world regions, an artifact of the Asian crisis and Latin American
stagnation.
Even though the democracy project failed to meet its ultimate goal
of purifying political practice and transforming state-civil society rela-
tions, important and durable changes have occurred. The discourse of
the integral state, with its subtext of a necessary monopoly of power
exercised repressively, all but vanished. Associational life, one mea-
sure of the vitality of civil society, now flourishes in much of the conti-
nent, with important consequences in such spheres as gender equity.
Abuses of human rights have significantly diminished, in part because
of the emergence of a new generation of human rights activists, abet-
ted by the ramifying international human rights community and the
expanding part such values play in the evolving international norma-
tive order. In most countries, an opposition press now exists in tandem
with the official media, vociferous in its exposure of malfeasance. Fre-
quency modulation radio made its appearance, ending the domestic
monopoly on broadcast media (though television remains mostly in
state hands). The very discipline of presentability, despite its obvious
limits, compels the regular organization of elections open to opposi-
tion formations. Respectability has its ransom in the susceptibility of
states to external monitoring. Even South Africa felt constrained to
invite international observers to monitor their post-transition 1999
election. Finally, the application of some form of democratic mecha-
nisms was a necessary element in the resolution of intractable civil
conflicts: witness Mozambique, Liberia, Namibia, and Algeria.
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VI. Return of the Ethnic Question
In the epoch of political opening, cultural pluralism returned to the
political agenda in a very different global environment than that of
1960. At the moment of African independence, the ontological primacy
of nation-state doctrine was, in retrospect, at an historical zenith. The
homogenizing vocation of nationhood was an assumed necessity.
Although African states, save for the Arab tier in the north, could not
interpret nation-building as assimilation to a dominant ethnocultural
identity, they could articulate a claim of the political and territorial
unit to sole legitimate occupancy of discursive identity space. African
states in their salad days went unusually far in stigmatizing cultural
identity as tribalism, a residue of backwardness having no place in the
realm of modernity.
By the time that political space was reopened for civil society in the
1980s, international discourse had radically altered. “Multicultural-
ism,” a term pioneered in Canada in 1965, became dominant as a char-
acterization of social reality. An earlier premise that macrohistorical
process inexorably eroded the social weight of ethnic consciousness
lost its credibility. Enforcement of homogeneity, in circumstances of
late modernity, was virtually impossible; accommodation to the reality
of diversity was the preferred route. Within Africa, partly as counter-
point to the widespread discredit of states, ethnicity became a domain
of civic virtue, where a recognizable set of moral precepts governed
social practice.47 Rather than an artifact of primitivity, ethnicity imaged
cultural authenticity, a heritage deserving nurture rather than rejec-
tion. Ethnicity and modernity were twins, not protagonists.
Thus, cultural pluralism found a degree of acknowledgment, if not
wholehearted acceptance. There was good reason for a degree of wari-
ness: mobilized religious or ethnic consciousness is capable of activat-
ing the wilder and most uncivil human passions through its tendency
to catalyze fears and anxieties regarding “the other,” and in extreme
instances permit the dehumanization and demonization of difference.
The terrible toll of a decade of combat with Islamist insurgent frag-
ments in Algeria, and the holocausts in Rwanda and Burundi, gave
grim warning of cultural solidarities run amok.
The political ambivalence with which cultural solidarities are now
viewed find expression in some of the institutional forms of political
liberalization. No one else followed the audacious Ethiopian path of
reconstituting the internal boundaries of the country on an ethnic prin-
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ciple and empowering the provinces with a right of self-determination,
including secession. In a number of countries, political parties based
on ethnicity or religion are proscribed (for example, Eritrea, Tanzania,
Nigeria, Algeria). In a number of instances, electoral systems designed
to induce power sharing and to avert zero-sum ethnic power struggles
have been adopted, often including a dose of proportional representa-
tion.48 Generally speaking, constitutional treatment of cultural plural-
ism eschews formal enunciation of group rights.
Yet the global intellectual environment was radically different at the
hour of independence. Understandings of the ethnic phenomenon
were largely essentialist in nature, even if “primordialism” was not yet
an explicitly elaborated mode of analysis.49 If ethnicity was a mere pri-
mordial residue—an atavistic embarrassment from a past demanding
erasure—then its widespread dismissal by intellectual observers
within and outside the continent was logical enough. But the emer-
gence in the intervening decades of instrumentalist and constructivist
schools of interpretation firmly linked cultural pluralism with moder-
nity itself.50 As African intellectuals detached notions of cultural
authenticity from the statist moorings provided by an earlier genera-
tion of political leaders (Leopold Senghor, Kwame Nkrumah, Mobutu
Sese Seko), ethnicity won standing as a legitimate site of public cul-
tural expression.
Various processes of identity construction are in progress within the
more permissive environment of the contemporary political moment.
The territorial state, as an identity container, remains a critical defining
arena, notwithstanding the porousness of numerous boundaries and
the emergence of substantial zones outside the control of central gov-
ernments. Here one may note the challenges raised to the national
ancestral authenticity of both ex-President Henri Bedie in Ivory Coast
and President Frederick Chiluba in Zambia, as well as their principal
rivals, Alassane Quattara and Kenneth Kaunda, not to mention recent
Ugandan and Rwandan whispers that Museveni is really Rwandan
and Paul Kagame a Ugandan. In addition, the one political conviction
shared by nearly all Congolese is resentment at the Rwandan and
Ugandan role in the current rebellions in the east, as well as the earlier
sweep across the country by the Laurent Kabila forces.
The singular identity-forming potency of territorial boundaries,
their colonial artificiality notwithstanding, even when they divide an
ethnic community, is given eloquent documentation by William Miles,
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in his impressively documented study of adjoining Hausa villages in
Nigeria and Niger:
Incongruously, provocatively, it towers on high: a fifteen-foot metal
pole, springing out of the dirty brown Sahelian sand. No other human
artifact is to be seen in this vast, barren, flat savanna; only an occasional
bush, a tenacious shrub, a spindly tree break up the monotonous, infinite
landscape. One stares and wonders how, by beast and porter, such a
huge totem could have been lugged here and erected in this desolate
bush. But there it stands: a marker of an international boundary, a mon-
ument to the splitting of a people, a symbol of colonialism, an idol of
‘national sovereignty.’
The pole, and its separation of Hausa villagers into Nigerians and Nige-
riens, “has become an internalized, commonplace reality for millions of
borderline villagers,” creating a distinction “not only maintained but
reinforced” since independence. His study shows “how effectively
national differences can be superimposed upon antecedent ethnic
identities and how powerfully boundaries function to reinforce this
process.”51
Important religious energies are at work in various locations and
whose full implications are poorly understood. In many parts of
Africa, there is a formidable proliferation of evangelical Protestant
sects under indigenous initiative. On the Islamic side, various currents
of reinterpretation are at work. The successor movement to the Muslim
Brotherhood has held power in Sudan for the last decade. In Nigeria,
in the words of Muslim scholar Sabo Bako, “Religion has been trans-
formed from a non-political issue into a leading volatile political phe-
nomenon,” partly mirroring complex conflicts between reformist
currents within Islam and older tariq (Sufi order) based structures
closely tied to the old ruling elite.52
On the ethnic front, a cultural intelligentsia takes its place, devoting
its talents to the study, standardization, and literary diffusion of many
African languages. These cultural scholars and their counterparts in
the domain of popular vernacular literature follow a trail of ethnic
entrepreneurship well trodden in other parts of the world. To cite but
one example, a modest Dakar bookshop vending written materials in
Pulaar (Fulani) has surprising sales figures, serving an audience of
modest means. The dedicated labors of those supporting this finan-
cially precarious venture draw sustenance from international encour-
Macalester International Vol. 9
20
agement; UNESCO recently sponsored an international conference
dedicated to the nurture and promotion of Pulaar, spoken from Mauri-
tania to Cameroon. Comparable efforts are afoot in other areas.
In the electoral realm, ethnicity and sometimes religion have played
some role since the democratic opening. In Kenya, ethnicity offers a
weapon deployed by incumbent Daniel Arap Moi to divide his opposi-
tion into ineffectiveness.53 In other countries, such as the Central
African Republic in 1999, ethno-regional voting clearly operated as the
major factor. In still other instances, ethnicity, though visible, was
much less pivotal (South Africa 1994 and 1999, Nigeria in 1999). In
Ghana in 1997, ethnic bloc voting was overwhelming only in Ewe con-
stituencies, in support of co-ethnic Jerry Rawlings. In yet other cases,
ethnic voting was of minor consequence (Senegal, Mali). The only
instances in which electoral competition or its prospect severed the
bonds of basic communal civility were Algeria, Rwanda, Burundi, and
Congo-Brazzaville. In all four cases, violent action taken to set aside
actual or prospective democratic outcomes bears the greatest responsi-
bility for the reign of lethal disorder, genocidal in Rwanda and
Burundi, which ensued.54
VII. State as Remedy: The Challenge of Disorder
A pattern as unexpected as democratization, which is now a defining
attribute of African politics at the turn of the century, is the spread and
institutionalization of large zones of disorder. Some theaters of
endemic civil conflict now extend back decades, especially the internal
wars in Sudan and Angola. But these zones of armed combat have in
the 1990s spread, interpenetrated, and joined to form a vast arc of dis-
order which engulfs the entire Horn of Africa, then extends southwest-
ward to the great lakes region and through both Congos and Angola.
A secondary terrain of conflict, recently more quiescent, has extended
during the 1990s from Mauritania to Liberia, affecting in particular
Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, and Sierra Leone. All told, about a third of
African states are caught up in these conflict zones, whose common
thread is the loss of the monopoly on military coercion, at least tem-
porarily.
An allied pattern is a new dynamic of armed power seizure: no
longer by a coup at the center, but by insurgent forces from the periph-
ery. Pioneering this pattern was the National Resistance Army led by
Yoweri Museveni in Uganda in 1986. Others who followed this exam-
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ple were Idriss Deby in Chad in 1990, Isaias Afewerki in Eritrea in
1991, Meles Zenawi in Ethiopia in 1991, Paul Kagame in Rwanda in
1994, Laurent Kabila in Congo-Kinshasa in 1997, and Denis Sassou-
Nguesso in Congo-Brazzaville in 1997. Beyond these cases, armed
operations from the periphery fatally undermined regimes in Somalia,
Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau. In all cases, there was a
marked ethnic coloration to the insurgent elements.
The consequences of such power seizures are profoundly different
than those of a coup at the center, which leaves the military instrument
intact. The defeat and dissolution of an army disperses fragments into
the countryside or neighboring countries, where they may reform into
insurgent militia, especially if outside aid is available. Also, much of
their armament may vanish into informal markets or remain with the
former soldiers. A landmark moment in the dramatic escalation of
unofficial arms flows was the disintegration, in 1991, of two of the
largest and most abundantly equipped armies in Africa, those of
Somalia and Ethiopia.
But dissolved armies are not the only source of the weaponry now
widely available. Proliferating militia in the zones of conflict can read-
ily obtain automatic guns, rocket-launchers, and land mines on the
international market, especially from the erstwhile Soviet bloc with
huge arms stocks and a desperate need for hard currency. In Uganda,
government sources suggest that as many as 35,000 AK47s are in the
hands of Karamoja pastoral warriors, a fact which has profoundly
altered the scale of cattle raiding and the internal dynamics of these
societies.55 In many countries, such weapons are readily available in
black markets, a sharp contrast with the situation in 1960, since the
colonial state had effectively disarmed its subjects.
The warlord as visible political actor enters the stage in the 1990s,
whose biography is well chronicled by William Reno.56 Charles Taylor
of Liberia and Jonas Savimbi of Angola are perhaps the prototypes, but
they now have a legion of imitators. Warlords, once in control of a high
value resource (gold, diamonds, timber, coffee), have developed well-
honed mercantile skills, exchanging such assets for arms and supply.
The kinds of insurgent operations now encountered in Africa bear lit-
tle resemblance to the revolutionary maquisards of Algeria, Mozam-
bique, or Vietnam — fish swimming in a sea of peasant supporters.
Instead, they have learned to operate freely in zones where they are
cordially detested by the populace. Intense antagonism to rebel militia
is clearly evident in Uganda with regard to the Lord’s Resistance Army
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in the north and the Allied Democratic Forces in the west; the Groupes
Islamiques Armés (GIA) in Algeria; the Cobras, Ninjas, and Zulus in
Congo-Brazzaville; and the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie
in Congo-Kinshasa. Animosity toward rebel militia, however, cannot
be equated with support for the central government, in several of these
cases also perceived as hostile to local interests.
Another novel factor explaining the sustainability of insurgency is
the existence among its leadership of sophisticated military knowl-
edge. The Congo-Kinshasa rebels of 1964 had only the most rudimen-
tary military skills. In contrast, the Rwandan-led sweep across the
country in 1996–1997 was an operational masterpiece. The key leaders
of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) had extensive military experi-
ence in the Museveni NRA, during and after its guerrilla stage. The
1998 Congo rebels had not only Rwandan and Ugandan military advi-
sors, but also former officers in the Mobutu army with overseas train-
ing. A Malian officer, in a recent research paper, explains why the
Tuareg revolt in the 1990s was impossible to repress militarily, in con-
trast to an uprising in the early 1960s, which was eliminated with con-
siderable brutality. The difference was leadership provided by
“Afghans,” veterans of the combat against Soviet forces in Afghanistan
in the 1980s.57 The GIA in Algeria had similar elements.
A disconcerting and deadly practice that has crept into recent
African insurgent warfare is the deliberate use of child soldiers.
Abduction of adolescents for guerrilla combat first came to notice in
the practices of the Resisténcia Nacional Moçambocana (RENAMO) dur-
ing the 1980s.58 Such children, isolated from their kin and communities,
subject to intimidation and sexual abuse by adult insurgents, com-
pelled to commit violent acts, often incited by drugs and the promise
of supernaturally guaranteed immunity to bullets, can become fear-
some combatants. Once forced into insurgent camps, they are also
aware that their own communities will not welcome them back. Ado-
lescent boys are feared as violent sociopaths, and girls irreparably
damaged by sexual abuse and exposure to AIDS.59
Insurgent militia can also find a readily recruitable pool of disaf-
fected, unemployed, impoverished youths in the refugee camps and
urban slums. The pathologically violent ethno-regional militia that
took shape in Congo-Brazzaville in 1993, then reformed in 1997, origi-
nated in such milieux. From such combustible forces, former President
Pascal Lissouba recruited his “Nibolek” Zulus, later Cocoyes; Brazza-
ville urban potentate Bernard Kolelas his Lari (Kongo) Ninjas; and past
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and present autocrat Sassou-Nguessou his Mbochi Cobras. After first
terrorizing and looting Brazzaville in 1993, they returned to street com-
bat in 1997, leading to an officially admitted 10,000 – 15,000 fatalities
and vast property destruction. In the somber analysis of a Congolese
scholar, the banditry and violence of these ethnic militia, whose social
targets include not only communal adversaries but the politician class
generally, form part of a pathology which becomes enrooted. Bazen-
guissa-Ganga concludes:
The process of democratic transition in Congo in the early 1990s had a
marked effect in disseminating the use of political violence throughout a
large section of society. . . . Hence an analysis of the violence of the
period, considered in terms other than as a dysfunctioning of the democ-
ratic process, can reveal much about the way in which political practice
in Congo has been transformed. This amounts to a redefinition of com-
mon social experience and popular conceptions of social status, the true
subject of the various conflicts which have been so tragically milita-
rized.60
When internal wars persist over time, they tend to generate a prolif-
eration of militia fragments. Governments are tempted to arm their
own militia (Kamajors in Sierre Leone, various Khartoum-financed
armed groups in southern Sudan, sundry “Mai-Mai” and Hutu
refugee groups in Congo-Kinshasa, village paramilitaries in Algeria).
The result is a complex pattern of wars within wars, difficult to extin-
guish.
Yet another novel and dismaying element is the multiplication of
private security forces, whose skills are available for rent by hard-
pressed governments. A market for mercenaries appeared simultane-
ously with African independence, initially in Katanga, and
periodically elsewhere. But the bundling of arms and private soldiers
into corporate form, contracting their combat capabilities and military
knowledge, is a phenomenon of the 1990s. It is partly a product of the
redundancy of elements of the erstwhile apartheid national security
machine. Executive Outcomes is only the most notorious of the new
purveyors of military services.
The growing tendency for insurgent militia to operate across bor-
ders creates interpenetration of security logics for a number of African
states. Senegal was drawn into a costly and fruitless intervention in
Guinea-Bissau by its preoccupation with Casamance rebels operating
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from that territory. Rwanda and Burundi regimes have morbid fear of
the incursions of Hutu militia operating from Congo-Kinshasa. Ugan-
dan dissidents, as well, found sanctuary on the Congo side of the
Ruwenzori mountains. This provided the motivation for Rwandan and
Ugandan overt backing of the 1996 and 1998 operations to oust Kin-
shasa regimes accused of tolerating rebel militia. This dynamic
reached its paroxysm in the Congo-Kinshasa imbroglio, drawing into
its vortex at various points eight foreign armies. The conflicts in the
Horn are similarly and intractably intertwined.
VIII. State, Cultural Pluralism, and Political Order: The Road Ahead
The deep fears awakened by the spread of large theaters of disorder
brought the issue of stateness squarely back into the center of reflec-
tion. The serious weakening of state fabrics, which was a product of
the failure of the integral state projects and the prolonged period of
economic decline in the 1970s and 1980s, came clearly into view. Policy
space now must accord equal priority, along with democratization and
accommodation of cultural pluralism, to the quest for an efficacious
state, able to guarantee political order and supply basic services to civil
society. The challenge is far more arduous than assumed in 1960, or in
the initial phases of democratic opening from the late 1980s onward.
In the euphoria accompanying the seeming collapse of patrimonial
autocracy at the beginning of the ’90s, the scope and implications of
state weakening were doubtless underestimated. The long period of
economic decline, the decimation of civil service capacities through the
radical shriveling of their livelihoods, and the widespread discrediting
of the state apparatus as merely predatory, had exacted a heavy price
in state capacity. Although, as Przeworski and Fernando document,
the possibility of democratization is not determined in some absolute
sense by level of development, its sustainability is influenced by low
per capita income and the state capacity to bring about tangible
improvement.61 The evidence of three decades of overwhelmingly
autocratic governance provides no support for the claim on a neces-
sary return to an authoritarian past. But political liberalization can
only succeed in partnership with a restoration of state capacity.
In the world at large, the contemporary moment of the more grace-
fully acknowledged cultural diversity of civil society has created a
global laboratory of political learning. Communal identities in most
cases cannot be contained within a purely private realm. But the
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resources of statecraft in the accommodation of diversity are consider-
able.62 Beyond the design of electoral systems mentioned earlier, vari-
ous modalities of power sharing, regional distribution of power or
decentralization, cultural sensitivity in language and educational poli-
cies, and a rule-of-law state respectful of group and individual dignity,
can enable the efficacious state to manage difference. Opening public
space to the expression of cultural diversity is not an open invitation to
secessionist movements. Indeed, a particularly striking attribute of
separatist movements in Africa is their disposition to ground their
claims in a territorial rather than an ethnic discourse. The only exam-
ples of effective separation are Eritrea and, de facto, Somaliland, both
restorations of colonial units. Although conventionally explained as
rooted in Diola dissatisfactions, on closer inspection of the long-run-
ning Casamance dissidence in Senegal, the secession argument rests
upon the assertion of a territorial identity of the zone, a notion para-
doxically first advanced by French settler interests.63 The same holds
true for Katanga, Biafra, and southern Sudan, where sovereignty
claims were asserted for a colonial administrative subdivision, even if,
as noted earlier, ethnic energies underpinned these demands.
Even in Congo-Kinshasa, where a Weberian state quietly expired
sometime in the 1980s and has never been restored, the multiple insur-
gent factions and their foreign allies all fight over the elusive fiction of
a Congolese state. In Somalia, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, the extended
periods of total state collapse were not accompanied by permanent
fragmentation, save for the separation of the formerly discrete colonial
entity of British Somaliland. Warlords manipulate ethnicity, but are
not ethnic entrepreneurs; even in Rwanda and Burundi, where ethnic-
ity has been most explicit in defining conflict, the struggle is for control
of an extant state, not remaking the state system.
Thus, in the long pendulum swings between democracy and state-
ness, perhaps a new resting-place will emerge. In the terminal colonial
period, democracy in the hands of African nationalism was the anti-
dote to the abuses of the autocratic colonial state. In the initial post-
colonial era, democracy as value succumbed to the higher claims of 
the integral state. The utter discredit of the patrimonial autocracy gave
rise to an excessive association of economic, then political, liberaliza-
tion with a subliminal animus toward the state as experienced. The
transparent threat posed to an African future of progress by wide-
spread disorder illuminates the urgent need for a reformed and
restored stateness. Only a stable synthesis of an Africanized version of
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the democratic and constitutional polity can assure the political order
indispensable to any economic progress, and the effective accommoda-
tion of the cultural diversity which is a defining feature of most
African states. 
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